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Abstract: This chapter is a review of our empirical  knowledge regarding  arms trade offsets. 
Extant  evidence  suggests  that  offset  arrangements  do  not  yield  net  benefits  for  a  country’s 
economic development. As a general rule arms trade offset deals are more costly than off-the-
shelf arms purchases, create little by way of new or sustainable employment, do not appear to 
contribute  in  any  substantive  way  to  general  economic  development,  and  with  very  few 
exceptions do not result in significant technology transfers, not even within the military sector. 
As of 2009, the United States and the European Union have taken official government positions 
against offset deals. Nonetheless, arms trade offsets are a flourishing practice.  
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Introduction 
 
In September 2002, an international conference on arms trade offsets and economic development 
was  held  in  Cape  Town,  South Africa and subsequently  an  edited  collection  was  produced, 
drawn  from  selected  conference  contributions  as  well  as  other  solicited  papers  (Brauer  and 
Dunne,  2004).  All  contributions  represented  original  work  and  were  peer-reviewed  and 
thoroughly edited before inclusion in the volume. The authors include the sweep of top-notch 
experts in the field. Their institutional affiliation ranges from university professors to think-tank 
fellows,  consultants  in  private  practice,  and  personnel  at  defense  institutes  and  defense 
academies.  The  geographic  origin  or  current  location  of  the  authors  spans  all  continents. 
Likewise, the case studies include countries from across the globe. In alphabetical order they are: 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The volume was published by Routledge in 
2004. This chapter is our summary of the state-of-the-art as reflected in the book’s chapters, 
supplemented  by  an  updated  literature  search  and  review  (through  to  July  2009)  and  by  a 
discussion of emerging issues and policy recommendations.  
 
Although both topics are treated in the book, we do not review here the theory of offsets nor the 
theory of the economic consequences of offsets. The literature search for 2004 - 2009 did not 
yield new empirical papers on arms trade offsets. We are aware of some work being conducted 
in East and Central Europe and of isolated interest in the topic in India and elsewhere but to our 
knowledge there has been no readily accessible, peer-reviewed literature in English since the 
chapters we commissioned for our 2004 book were published. This book still appears to be the 
latest word on the subject matter. In terms of policy, however, both the United States and the 
European  Union  now  officially  declare  offset  deals  to  be  undesirable;  this  is  explained  and 
explored in the main text. The next section considers the nature of offsets, followed by a section 
discussing the mechanics of offset deals and then one reviewing the evidence of their impact on 
both sellers and procurers, before concluding with a discussion of the issues involved and lessons 
to be learned. Where we make use of references to our book, we cite them as (author, page), e.g., 
(Markusen, p. 81), so that readers are enabled to look up specific details in the book. 
 
 




The very definition of what offsets are is disputed. Nonetheless, the main idea is this: ordinarily, 
a country that wishes to spend, say, $100 million to import arms from another country transfers 
$100 million worth of funds to the arms seller, the only value gained in return being the putative 
national security-value of the imported arms.
1 To increase the exchange value, the importing 
country may stipulate that the arms exporting country or firm must take some portion of its $100 
million revenue to set up arms co-production facilities in the arms importing country, or else to 
commit itself to any of a variety of other possible activities that would secure a flow-back of 
some or all of the $100 million to the arms purchasing country. If this flow-back is made part of the arms trade contract, we call this an offset. The advertised benefit is that the importing country 
obtains not only the arms but that some of the public funds expended on the arms purchase 
“remain” in the country and are thus expected to stimulate domestic economic development, just 




To be able to double-dip – to get the arms and yet to keep the money at home – is seductive for 
politicians, especially in democracies, who must justify expenditure of public funds, usually in 
the face of crying social need. The logic sounds so convincing: sign a contract that requires the 
arms selling party to use some or all of the expended funds to set up arms production facilities in 
the purchasing country or to make nonmilitary purchases in or from the arms acquiring country 
that otherwise would not have been made. In the post-cold war buyers’ market, buyers have the 





The use of offsets is by no means restricted to the field of arms trade. Offsets, and related forms 
of countertrade, constitute a vast, pervasive business practice involving tens of thousands of 
people around the globe, reaching far beyond the market for military-related items. The size of 
the trade is variously estimated at ranging between 5 and 30 percent of world trade. However, 
governments and international organizations do not track the value of offset trade separately. All 
estimates offered in the literature and press are guesses and it is by no means clear how they are 
arrived at. 
  With regard to the arms trade, some countries do undertake efforts to track the value of 
offsets, especially the United States where legislation mandates offsets tracking and an annual 
report to Congress.
2 The implementing agency is the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) 
within the Department of Commerce. The thirteenth annual report was issued in December 2008 
and  covers  the  15-year  span  from  1993  to  2007.
3  For  example,  for  2007  alone,  total  U.S. 
defense-related merchandise exports were $16.7 billion of which contracts to the value of $6.7 
billion  came  with  an  offset  obligation  agreement  (ca.  40%).  The  value  of  the  agreements 
amounted to $5.4 billion (ca. 80%). Thus, for 2007 the value of agreements over total exports 
was $5.4/$16.7 billion, or 32.3 percent. 
  For  this  entire  1993-2007  time  period,  BIS  reports  9,249  arms  trade  offset  transactions 
(rather than agreements, promises which may or may not be fulfilled in future), affecting 53 
companies and 48 countries for an actual transactions value of $45.73 billion and an offsets value 
of  $53.61  billion.  The  offsets  value  is  higher  than  the  actual  value  because  of  the  use  of 
multipliers whereby an actual value is multiplied to count toward offset obligation (usually if it is 
in a preferred industry/product group, as explained below). In this case, the ratio of 53.61/45.73 
implies an average multiplier of 1.17. Actual transaction values have been on the order of about 
$2 billion a year with a marked rise toward $4-$5 billion in the 2000s (see Figure 1). On average, 
across all the years covered, U.S. defense exports with an offset obligation make up about 40 
percent of all defense export sales and of those, offsets values are the order of 70 percent of the 
arms contract value. 
  If one makes the assumption that the United States accounts for one-third of the world arms trade (Brauer, 2007, p. 979 based on a 55-
year record of SIPRI arms transfer values 
data)  and  that  importing  countries’ 
average  offset  demands  are  reflected  in 
what they demand from the United States 
then an initial guess at the dollar value of 
worldwide  offset  transactions  values 
would run to about $135 billion (3 x $45 
billion) over this 15-year period, or about 
$9 billion per year. However, the sum of 
offsets  agreements  (transactions  to  be 
fulfilled in future) was about $65 billion 
for the United States (BIS, 2008, p. 4, Table 3-1); thrice that would be $195 billion worldwide, 
or about $13 billion per year, a not insubstantial sum.
4 Because agreements include an offsets 
multiplier,  the  $13  billion  needs  to  be  “discounted” accordingly.  If  one  uses  the  1993-2007 
average of 1.17 for the United States, one arrives at about $11 billion of worldwide annual offset 
agreements resulting in future actual offset transaction values, still an appreciable sum.  
 
Countries’ objectives and strategies 
 
Arms importing countries’ offset objectives do, of course, evolve over time and their strategies 
change as their objectives evolve. Some states target certain arms niches that they wish to learn 
to master for themselves and they structure arms import acquisition and offset demands toward 
the  fulfillment  of  this  goal  (e.g.,  Singapore,  Taiwan).  Other  countries  have  well-developed 
specialized  arms  production  niches  and  use  arms  trade  offsets  to  assist  them  to  maintain 
international competitiveness in that niche. Their objective has evolved from vaguely promoting 
general economic development to the development and maintenance of specific arms-production 
competences (e.g., Sweden, the Netherlands). Still other countries (e.g., Brazil, India, Indonesia) 
appear driven by regional power ambitions that would dictate the development of an indigenous 
ability to produce a sweeping plate of weapon systems in-country, and they therefore pursued or 
pursue an arms sourcing and offset strategy with broad technology transfer requirements. Yet 
other  states  (e.g.,  South  Korea)  seek  an  ability  to  produce  a  wide  spectrum  of  systems  not 
because of regional power ambitions but because of a general desire and increasing ability to 
broadly participate in all industrial markets. Still other states appear to view arms offsets as an 
opportunity to revive a collapsed or failed indigenous arms industry (e.g., Poland). Other states 
(e.g., the United Kingdom) view offsets as a tool toward reaching an ever more advanced state of 
a globally integrated arms manufacturing system in which producers residing in various states 
produce  components  for  sometimes  this  and  sometimes that  lead-manufacturer.  The primary 
objective is joint production parceled out to competitive, cost-minimizing producers across the 
globe (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 106), and offsets can help states to position themselves at the 
top of the arms supply chain. And still other countries appear to more naively view arms offsets 






Figure 1: U.S. offset contracts, agreements, transactions, 

















While countries’ offset objectives are codified in arms offset policies that naturally vary among 
states and vary within states over time, a set of universal characteristics that define countries’ 
offset arrangements in practice can be discerned. These characteristics include: (1) that importing 
countries generally mandate offset requirements by law, often to 100 percent of the arms contract 
value; (2) that offset requirements start at some minimum contract value, often as low as $5 
million;  (3)  that  multipliers  are  frequently  attached  to  offset  deals,  meaning  that  a  specific 
transaction value (say, $10 million) can be multiplied to count toward a higher value (say, $15 
million) in fulfillment of the offset obligation; (4) that virtually all arms trade contracts now 
contain clauses that subject arms exporters to a variety of penalties for nonfulfillment of offset 
obligations  (e.g.,  exclusion  from  consideration  for  future  contracts).  In  addition,  there  are 
expectations  (5)  that  offsets  will  reduce  arms  acquisition  costs;  (6)  that  job  creation  and 
generalized economic development will result in the arms acquiring country; (7) that the offset 
will result in new and sustainable work (i.e., that the offset not merely replace work that would 
have been sourced in-country anyway and that it not be one-off but continuous work); and (8) 
that the offsets result in general and specific technology transfers since technology is seen as a 
key component of future economic prosperity. 
  Elements  crucially  missing  in  these  offset  characteristics  are  offset  contract  monitoring, 
auditing, and feedback to the importing country’s defense contract-issuing organization and a 
plain  economic  valuation  of  whether  or  not  the  stated  military  and  economic  objectives 
associated with offsets have been met. Tellingly, very few countries have ever carried out even a 
single formal and independent offset-contract audit to determine to what degree, if any, the hopes 






As a rule, importing countries mandate offsets formally or informally, frequently to 100 percent 
of the arms contract value. For example, the United Kingdom typically asks for 100 percent 
(Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 107). Likewise, Germany typically asks for 100 percent offset both 
during its rearmament period as well as today (p. 110). The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden) all have minimum contract values at which 100 percent offsets are demanded 
(Hagelin, p. 138). 
  Some countries ask and receive (promises) for more than 100 percent offsets. For example, 
when Poland signed an aircraft deal with an American company valued at $3.5 billion offsets 
were to amount to a value of $5.5 billion (Markowski and Hall, p. 172; 181; the U.S. values 
these offsets even higher). In one spectacular deal, South Africa is supposed to receive offsets 
valued at several times the value of the underlying arms import contract. Under a new EU offsets 
code of conduct, effective 1 July 2009, participating states agree to place a cap of 100 percent on 
offsets (more on the EU code later on in the chapter). But other countries ask for less than 100 
percent offsets. Ordinarily, this happens in small economies whose industrial structure may have 
difficulty absorbing huge offset deals. For example, for contracts beyond about $13 million, 
Denmark’s offset demands drop to 30 percent on the recognition that Denmark cannot absorb large offset programs (Hagelin, p. 139). In fact, offset demands can drop to zero, as in the case of 
Finland  and  Norway  (Hagelin,  p.  143).  In  Taiwan,  in  contracts  above  $50  million,  “the 
government seeks between 30 to 60 percent in offsets” (Chinworth, p. 245). For a time, Australia 
asked for only 30 percent offsets on contracts valued at A$2.5 million or above (Markowski and 
Hall, p. 272). Similarly, New Zealand generally asks for around 30 percent (Markowski and 
Hall, p. 275). 
  Most  countries  have  formal  offset  laws,  policies,  or  regulations.  There  are  exceptions, 
however. These include for example Germany (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 108), India (Baskaran, 
p. 217), and Japan (Chinworth, p. 237). In these cases, there nonetheless exist well-understood 
informal offset policies. Germany for instance effectively runs a procurement cartel to which 
foreign suppliers gain access only by joining a German-led consortium such that foreign-sourced 
items  are  channeled  via  German  (co)production.  Singapore,  likewise,  has  no  formal  offsets 
policy  but  channels  most  contracts  through  a  special  corporation  set  up  to  deal  with  arms 
production issues (Bitzinger, p. 262). 
  During the 1990s, a number of countries shifted emphasis from a lofty general economic 
development goal to more narrowly conceived objectives, seeking special technology transfer 
assistance via offsets for their own military equipment production. These countries include for 
example all of the Nordic countries (Hagelin, p. 143; Sköns, p. 152). Poland’s recent aircraft and 
armored vehicle deals are specifically tied to a hoped-for reinvigoration of its moribund post-
Communist arms production industry (Markowski and Hall, chapter 12). 
  If  not  specifically  tied  to  military  industry,  many  countries  focus  their  offset  efforts  on 
technology  transfers  tied  to  local  industry  (military  or  otherwise).  This  would  include  for 
instance Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand. Only a few countries now, such as South Africa, 
still  seem  to  believe  that  offsets  can  result  in  across-the-board  generalized  economic 
development and job creation. 
 
Minimum offset-contract values 
 
Countries recognize that offset administration involves fixed and marginal costs. They therefore 
stipulate minimum arms contract values at which offset requirements kick in. For example, in 
Denmark foreign-sourced military contracts up to about $3 million are offset free; beyond that 
offset requirements are applied (Hagelin, p. 139). In the United Kingdom, the minimum value is 
set at £10 million (£50 million for France and Germany under a reciprocal waiver agreement) 
although Britain automatically asks for offsets on any deal, regardless of the amount, involving 
the United States (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 106).  For  Poland, the minimum  at which 100 
percent offsets are demanded is set at contracts valued above $5 million of which at least half 
must benefit the defense industry (Markowski and Hall, p. 179). In Brazil, offsets are asked for 
contracts over $1 million, and 100 percent offsets for contracts over $5 million (Perlo-Freeman, 
p. 192). South Korea, “applies offset requirements for any defense transaction in excess of $10 
million. The minimum required offset is 30 percent, “but has been raised to 70 percent for some 
recent, high-profile programs” (Chinworth, p. 241). Taiwan “seeks between 30 to 60 percent in 
offsets in arms sales above $50 million” (Chinworth, p. 243). And in South Africa contracts 





Many  countries  apply  multipliers  to  offset  fulfillment.  This  means  that  if  an  arms  exporter 
invests say $50 million in an activity that is particularly desired by the importing country (often 
some form of technology transfer), the $50 million may be counted at some multiple toward 
offset fulfillment. This multiple can range from some very small number such as 0.1 (that is, an 
extra 10 percent) to numbers as large as 5, 6, or even higher. In the Nordic countries, the size of 
multipliers is falling: in Finland from 20+ to now as low as 0.5; in Denmark no multipliers are 
offered at all except for high tech cases; Sweden’s maximum multiplier is three but is restricted 
to limited cases; Norway’s maximum is five and goes as low as 0.1 (Hagelin, p. 140). Poland 
uses multipliers of 0.5 to 2 and exceptionally of up to 5 (Markowski and Hall, p. 179). New 
Zealand uses multipliers between one and three (Markowski and Hall, p. 275). Like Denmark, 
the United Kingdom offers no multipliers at all. Moreover, offsets are credited to the arms seller 
only when transferred technology is actually used by a U.K. firm (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 
107). 
  All-in-all,  we  gain  the  impression  that  the  size  of  multipliers  has  been  falling  over  the 
decades. For the United States for 1993-2007 offset multipliers applied to only 12.4 percent of 
arms offset contracts (1,145/9,249 contracts). In the other 87.6 percent, U.S. arms exporters had 
to deliver the full offset value. For the same time period, in value terms — i.e., offset credit value 
over transaction value — the average multiplier amounts to about 17 percent. As smaller contract 
and value numbers imply that more actual offset value must be delivered, this means that buying 





Arms  offset  contracts  routinely  contain  clauses  that  subject  arms  exporters  to  a  variety  of 
penalties for nonfulfillment of offset obligations such as exclusion from consideration for future 
contracts in the country or cash penalties. (Enforcement of course is an entirely different matter.) 
Norway for instance imposes a penalty of not less than 10 percent of the contract value
8 and 
Denmark  simply  blacklists  or  bans  the  supplier  (Hagelin,  p.  141),  as  does  South  Korea 
(Chinworth, p. 241). In Poland, the offset provider may be held liable for “liquidated damages 
equivalent to 100 percent of the outstanding offsets obligation” (Markowski and Hall, p. 179). 
But in practice, Markowski and Hall write (p. 182), “liquidated damages are set initially at 4 
percent for four  years – not 100 percent as required under the Act – and subsequently at 3 
percent.” Likewise, Australia and New Zealand use liquidated damages as their penalty option 






In  the  political  and  news  media  arenas,  the  expectation  is  that  offsets  will  reduce  arms 
procurement costs  to  the  importing country; and certainly  that  there  be no  cost  premium  as 
compared  to  off-the-shelf  arms  purchases.  Australia  for  instance  has  an  explicit  “no  cost 
premium” expectation (Markowski and Hall, p. 272). But this is illusionary. The administrative 
cost of offsets alone is believed to cost arms sellers anywhere from 7 to 10 percent of contract 
value (Markusen, p. 71), and this cost must be recovered in some form.   In practice, many countries recognize and pay for the additional cost. For example, Germany 
asked for 100 percent offsets during its rearmament period and additional costs were accepted if 
this led to technology transfers, i.e., long-term gains (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 110). When 
several European nations bought F-16 aircraft from General Dynamics in 1975 they paid an extra 
34 percent, an estimate that does “not include the costs of the extra time and delays involved in 
the F-16 coproduction program compared with a direct buy from the USA (e.g., the costs of 
running-on  old  equipment)”  (Hartley,  p.  130).  Even worse,  in  the  context of  intra-European 
collaborative projects, Hartley reports cost premium estimates ranging from 33 to 100 percent for 
certain  collaborative  arms  acquisition  projects  (e.g.,  the  Merlin  helicopter,  the  Eurofighter 
Typhoon) as compared to projections for go-it-alone acquisition (Hartley, p. 119). OCCAR, a 
four-nation  procurement  agency  (France,  Germany,  Italy,  U.K.),  is  an  attempt  to  base 
procurement awards on  competition rather than  juste retour but its success is to be awaited 
(Hartley, p. 120), as is that of a yet to be established pan-European Arms Procurement Agency. 
  Even the U.K.’s participation in the U.S. dominated Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is 
estimated to be 4 percent more expensive than outright purchase. The extra 4 percent will buy 
access to participation and technology, and a go-it-alone program would cost Britain 60 to 105 
percent more (Hartley, p. 123). One risk is that already announced reductions in the number of 
units to be acquired by the United States will raise unit costs for the United Kingdom and other 
JSF  partner  nations  (Hartley,  p.  126)  so  that  the  ultimate  cost  may  be  much  higher  than 
anticipated. 
  For the Nordic countries, Hagelin reports that Denmark now acknowledges that offsets result 
in added costs and Finland estimates 10 to 15 percent added cost per offset contract (Hagelin, p. 
143). For Finland and Sweden, Sköns reports that for both mandatory and voluntary offsets costs 
are higher as compared to off-the-shelf purchases (p. 150). The  Finnish  F/A-18 Hornet deal 
added between $100 and $200 million in contract administration cost alone that the  Finnish 
government agreed to bear. This amounted to 3 to 6 percent of the contract value (Sköns, p. 154). 
In both  Finland and Sweden, part of the motivation to switch from vaguely defined  general 
economic development offsets to purely defense-oriented offsets was not only the difficulty to 
properly target general offsets but also their associated cost (Sköns, p. 160). 
  For  Belgium,  Struys  reports  offset-related  “overcosts”  estimated  at  20  to  30  percent  of 
imported  items  (Struys,  pp.  166-167).  Poland’s  public  procurement  law  of  1994  aimed  at 
competitive  tendering  and  transparency  contains  certain  crucial  exemptions  with  regard  to 
defense acquisitions so that cost savings are unlikely to be achieved; they cannot, at any rate, be 
monitored  because  transparency  rules  have  been  undermined  for  defense  acquisitions 
(Markowski and Hall, pp. 178; 182). 
  In  Brazil,  Perlo-Freeman  reports  that  “the  sheer  size  and  complexity  of  major  warship 
projects has given rise to serious cost inflation and delays, unmitigated by export orders” (p. 197) 
and across all arms acquisition categories he notes “the added cost of such deals compared with 
off-the-shelf procurement” and that “this was accepted by the government as a necessary price 
for  obtaining  technology”  (p.  197).  This  assessment  also  reflects  India’s  experience  where 
licensed  technology  programs  in  tanks,  aircraft,  and  naval  vessels  “faced  delays  and  cost 
overruns, and resulted in spectacular failures” (Baskaran, p. 218). In its dealings with western 
suppliers, such as Britain, France, and Sweden, India tended to make use of credit arrangements 
“to  cover  the  foreign  exchange  burden.  However,  evidence  suggests  that  such  arrangements 
resulted in increased selling prices” (Baskaran, p. 221). Likewise, India’s arms relation with 
Russia  and  eastern  Europe  “appears  to  have  resulted  in  a  significant  burden  on  the  Indian economy” (pp. 223-224). 
  Regarding South Korea, Chinworth writes that it “would be premature to label the country’s 
policies and experiences as a collective failure, but it also would be generous to characterize 
them as a success” (p. 243). For Indonesia’s civilian aircraft program, based on offset deals, 
Bitzinger reports that its “apparent success was illusory ... In reality, [it] was a bloated, state-
owned white elephant, employing many more workers than it needed and was awash in excess 
production  capacity”  (p.  264).  For  instance,  the  government  poured  about  $1  billion  into  a 
particular civilian airliner that eventually failed to received FAA certification and thereby made 
it impossible to bring the aircraft to market anywhere. 
  For Australia as well, a form of offsets called Strategic Industry Development Activities 
(SIDAs) are thought to contain a cost premium (Markowski and Hall, pp. 273-274), although 
mostly of unspecified and uncertain size. In one case, the Australian Department of Defense 
“itself calculated that the cost premium paid for local industry participation in assembly of F/A-
18 aircraft in the late 1980s amounted to 29 percent of the value of the additional work required 
to be done in Australia (Markowski and Hall, p. 280). The authors note that “industry outcomes 
associated with offsets have failed to live up to their promise” and they make the important point 
that mere “compliance with offset requirements should not be interpreted to benefit the defense 
department and/or the economy at large” (p. 280). 
  Finally, a South African arms procurement deal with certain European nations was trumpeted 
to  generate  some  65,000  new  jobs  but  Dunne  and  Lamb  point  out  that  while  “this  sounds 
impressive [it] amounts to a cost of R1.6 million per job and is extremely high, nearly 20 times 
the average cost per job in South Africa’s defense industry” (p. 288). As in the case for other 
countries, the authors  argue that “the arms deal has had a positive effect on South Africa’s 
economy, particularly in defense-related industry – after all, the billions must buy something – 
but there is little evidence that the predicted level of benefits have been or will be reached” (p. 
289). In 2000, personnel at the South African ministries of finance and of trade and industry 
estimated the overall return on the arms deal “to be on the order of 94.5 percent ... [and] that 
during the duration of the deal, anticipated exports would be in the region of 280 percent of the 
original purchase price” (Haines, p. 303).  But in his case study, Haines finds “substantial hidden 
costs associated with offsets” (p. 312).  For example, substantial state investment in regional 
infrastructure and other resources would be needed for offsets to work as planned but were not 
forthcoming for the cases and regions he examined. “Yet this kind of cost is not factored into 
official assessments of the Strategic Defense Program and the associated offset work” (p. 312). 
  Suppose country A procures $1 billion worth of arms from country B with a 100 percent 
offset requirement to be fulfilled in the form of arms co-production in country A. Also suppose 
that there is a 30 percent cost premium. One way to view the cost aspect of offsets then is to say 
that since country B returns funds to country A, the net external cost to A is if not zero than 
certainly smaller as compared to a pure off-the-shelf purchase.
9 There is thus no question that 
offsets work in the sense that funds are returned to the importing country,
10 although it has never 
yet  been  shown  –  and  often  been  questioned  (e.g.,  Brauer,  2002)  –  just  what  this  foreign-
exchange saving would amount to. But another view is to observe that country A spent a fiscal 
total  of  $1.3  billion  ultimately  to be  raised  from  its  taxpayers.  The  scant  evidence we  have 
suggests that the extra $300 million – the offset “overcost” – does not buy general economic 
development, does not buy new and sustainable work, and except for limited, specific cases does 
not result in appreciable technology transfer. This is explored in the next subsections. 
 Generalized economic development? 
 
Even if offsets result in higher total contract cost this could be justified if general economic 
development is stimulated, as politicians claim and as the news media repeat. The evidence is 
mixed, however, with the balance of evidence pointing to adverse experiences. In the United 
Kingdom  for  instance,  offsets  are  generally  directed  at  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs) and as a consequence of involvement in the American C-130J Hercules transport aircraft 
“some UK SMEs are now embedded in the supply chain” (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 107). But 
the objective here centered on getting U.K. companies embedded in supply chains whether or not 
offsets were offered (in fact, in this particular case direct offsets were very small). 
  Emphasis on SMEs was also important to Denmark and Finland (Hagelin, p. 139) but with 
little  evidence  that  this  strategy  worked.  To  the  contrary,  a  1999  Finnish  offset  audit 
acknowledged that except for some degree of technology transfer, other anticipated offset gains 
were not realized (Hagelin, p. 143). This is echoed by Sköns, whose review of offset audits in 
Finland and Sweden finds mostly negative experiences that led both countries to shift offset 
objectives  from  vague,  general  economic  development  objectives  toward  narrowly  defined 
military-industry related offsets (p. 160). 
  Germany appears to have taken a more practical approach from the start of its rearmament 
program  by  locating  and  tightly  integrating  military  technology  and  defense  production  in 
civilian firms, often in peripheral areas to assist regional economic development.
11 A similarly 
focused approach, in this case targeted on certain key industries, has been taken by Taiwan. This 
differs from Japan and South Korea, both of which have aimed – without success – at self-
sufficient production in all defense systems (Chinworth, p. 245). Not unlike Denmark, Belgium, 
and New Zealand today, Taiwan realized early on that certain “practical obstacles exist that limit 
the economic impact of offset agreements with Taiwan. Analysts have noted that few companies 
or  research  organizations  within  Taiwan  have  sufficient  capability  to  manage  large  military 
programs”  (Chinworth,  p.  245).  But  limiting  work  directed  toward  its  civilian  sector  to  15 
percent of all offset work “minimizes the multiplier effects of offsets” (Chinworth, pp. 245-246). 
In Poland, offsets are seen as a way to rebuild its ailing defense industry (Markowski and Hall, p. 
172) but whether this succeeds and how many sustainable jobs are to be created remains to be 
seen. The Poles at least appeared to have learned from other countries’ experiences that promises 
of general economic development will likely go unfulfilled. 
  Whatever the official rhetoric for public consumption, a number of countries have been clear 
that  their  primary  purpose  with  arms  trade  offset  work  regards  not  general  economic 
development but development of the indigenous arms industry, for example Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Poland. This is also true of Brazil where “offset policy and practice ... involving 
licensed production, coproduction, and technology transfer has been pursued not so much for 
direct economic benefit but to develop Brazil’s arms industry to fulfill a certain view of its place 
in the world” (Perlo-Freeman, p. 199). 
  As mentioned, countries that did harbor and pursue general economic development appear to 
have given up on this objective (e.g., the Nordic countries). Nonetheless, some countries still 
pursue  this  dream.  These  include  Indonesia  and  South  Africa.  The  case  of  Indonesia  also 
illustrates a particular vulnerability. Bitzinger writes: “The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis was 
the defining event that forced Jakarta to reexamine and ultimately dramatically scale back its 
ambitious plans for its aerospace industry and instead to greatly downsize its arms industry” (p. 
264). South Africa also has yet to learn from the prevailing experience. Its officials sought to link offset projects “with other national economic and industrial policy initiatives, such as ... Spatial 
Development Initiatives and  Industrial  Development Zones,”  even though analysts suggested 
that many of the promised investments were dubious and now seem to have been correct (Dunne 
and Lamb, p. 288). In his study on regional economic development in South Africa, Haines for 
instance finds few, if any, positive effects. To the contrary, “the recent arms deal will probably 
reinforce the current economic situation and existing [regional and other] inequalities in South 
Africa” (Haines, p. 303).  
  The lesson is that virtually no evidence exists that general economic development goals are 
ever achieved via offsets. Germany may be the exception, back in the 1950s. 
 
New and sustainable work? 
 
Another criterion often expressed by officials is that offsets not merely replace work that would 
have been sourced in-country anyway and that it not be one-off but continuous work. Mawdsley 
and Broska for instance write that the United Kingdom requires new work for its defense-related 
industry, moreover new work that is of equivalent technical quality than would otherwise be 
bought off-the-shelf. This is to avoid offset in-sourcing of inappropriately low-tech work (p. 
106). This resulted from the U.K.’s disagreeable experience with its Boeing AWACS purchase in 
the 1980s. In that case, the U.K. agreed to 130 percent offset work but little genuinely new work 
resulted.  For  instance,  Rolls-Royce  aircraft  engines  that  Boeing  bought  for  its  commercial 
airlines were counted as offset work – accounting in fact for half of the entire offset obligation – 
even though these civilian airliner engines would have been bought anyway (Hartley, pp. 120-
121). For examples like these, it is estimated that offset work in developed countries brings in 
perhaps only 25 to 50 percent genuinely new but not necessarily sustained or sustainable work 
(Hartley, p. 121). 
  Mawdsley and Brzoska write that in spite of decades of arms licensing and co-operation with 
Germany, Argentina received virtually no long-term benefit (p. 114). This underscores Brauer’s 
argument and evidence that a minimum condition for successful indigenous arms production 
efforts is that existing civilian industry must already exist from which a state may branch out into 
military-related  work  (Brauer  1991,  2000).  Sköns  cites  “extremely  limited”  job  and  export 
creation for SMEs on account of Finland’s Hornet F/A-18 deal (p. 153). Struys emphasizes that 
Belgium practices an explicit regional political sharing of offsets among its Flemish, Walloon, 
and Brussels regions. This contributes to offset-related overcosts since work allocation decisions 
are  made  on  the  basis  of  a  political  rather  than  economic  calculus  (p.  167).  Perlo-Freeman 
reports that Brazil’s anticipated Mirage fighter replacement (on the order of $700 million) is not 
thought likely to result in sustainable work unless unexpected export orders were to come in (p. 
195). Indeed, of all of Brazil’s extensive indigenous arms production ventures started since the 
1930s  with  various  forms  of  offsets  only  a  single  one  –  Helibras  –  might  be  deemed 
commercially viable (p. 196). 
  Indonesia’s attempt to create an indigenous military and civilian aircraft industry collapsed in 
the wake of the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia. The main aircraft corporation, IPTN, was 
forced to restructure and, by 2000, accumulated a debt of $570 million. It also had to lay off 
“around one-third of its workforce, or 5,000 employees” and anticipates to cut an additional 
3,500 jobs in the near future (Bitzinger, p. 264). The most egregious recent job generation claim 
is that of South Africa. It claimed that its arms offset deal will result in 65,000 new jobs over 
seven years. To Dunne and Lamb, “this sounds impressive but amounts to a cost of R1.6 million per job and is extremely high, nearly 20 times the average cost per job in South Africa’s defense 
industry” (p. 288) and it is “not clear that the companies will be internationally competitive to 
allow follow-on industrial development to be sustainable” (p. 290).
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  Once more, the main lesson is that there is virtually no positive and certainly no compelling 
evidence  that  offsets  create  new,  let  alone  sustainable  jobs.  The  mere,  but  very  common, 
assertion of states and their offsets agencies claiming “success” is not evidence. For example, the 
United Arab Emirates’ (UEA) Offset Program Bureau (OPB) reports in its issue 3, April 2008, 
newsletter on Nextcare Administrative Services (NAS), a healthcare claims administrator. This is 
“incorporated in Abu Dhabi as a joint venture between the Alfia Investment Company LLC, a 
company under the UAE Offset Program umbrella, and the National Investor, a leading UAE 
investment  firm.”
13  It  is  utterly  unclear  why,  in  the  absence  of  offsets,  a  healthcare  claims 
processor could not have been established anyway. Likewise, OPB proudly reports the creation 
of  a  new  holding  company  —  Tawazun  Holding  —  in  October  2007  that  promptly  bought 
“Caracal International, the first national arms manufacturer in the United Arab Emirates.” Jobs 
and assets already existed, and the newsletter reader must remain mystified as to the exact nature 




With regard to general and specific technology transfer directed either toward military or civilian 
industry the record is also mixed. Military-offsets are considered highly desirable for instance to 
help maintain the U.K. defense industrial base (Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 106) but the quality of 
that transfer must frequently be doubted. With regard to the aforementioned Boeing AWACS 
deal, Hartley writes that U.K. work on aircraft galleys and on-board toilets was counted as “high 
technology” (p. 121). During the competition to supply replacement fighter aircraft for the Royal 
Air  Force  in  the  U.K.,  Lockheed  Martin  made  certain  claims  in  favor  of  its  advanced  F-16 
aircraft.  But  Hartley  writes  that  “these  claimed  benefits  are  rarely  supported  with  empirical 
evidence ... for example, reference to the technology benefits of offsets rely on ad hoc examples, 
such as the transfer of US production and management technology to European co-producers. 
Rarely is consideration given to assessing the market value of such technology and who pays for 
these benefits (governments or firms)” (p. 130). 
  The  experience  with  civilian-oriented  technology  transfers  appears  to  be  worse  than  the 
examples with military-offset technology transfers already suggest. This is the reason why all 
Nordic countries, but especially Sweden, are now primarily interested in technology transfers 
that support indigenous military industry (Hagelin, p. 139). Sköns adds that while technology 
transfer and export promotion are “complicated to evaluate” (p. 156) Sweden’s experience with 
civilian offset attempts have been most negative (p. 159). 
  In contrast, a number of authors report that military-directed technology transfers originating 
with offset deals are considered successful in some country’s own terms, at least in certain cases, 
for example in the case of Brazil, which as a result of technology transfer strategy ended up with 
a  world  leader  in  the  regional,  Embraer.  This  was,  however,  achieved  through  massive 
government investment and subsidy and Brazil is still nowhere near having fully autonomous 
arms production in any sector. 
  Likewise  for  India. Baskaran’s assessment is that  while  there  is  no  question that  certain 
technologies were successfully transferred, “the industry failed to acquire capabilities sufficient 
to close the technology gap with developed countries and keep pace with technological change in weapon systems” (p. 219; also p. 224). A particular problem seemed to be that “technology 
transfers at the level of whole systems worked less efficiently than at component level as sellers 
tended to withhold core technologies” (Baskaran, p. 220). This hints at what Chinworth found 
for the case of Taiwan. He writes that its “efforts to develop indigenous systems in the 1990s 
resulted in  items  that  remained  heavily  dependent  on  imported  technology;  not  all  domestic 
development programs were successful” (p. 246).
14 A response to or proper anticipation of such 
experiences  explains  the  relatively  more  successful  cases  of  Singapore  and  Germany.  With 
regard  to  the  former,  Bitzinger’s  view  is  that  “Singapore’s  defense  industry  appears  to  be 
thriving, largely because of its core competencies/niche production business strategy” (p. 264). 
The available offset work is limited in scope but sustainable, even spilling into the nondefense 
sector.  Tellingly,  the  requirement  rather  than  consequence  of  this  strategy  is  its  “significant 
impact on further diminishing the nation’s already low attachment to offsets as an industrial 
policy,” and in the case of its participation in the U.S. JSF project the country explicitly rejected 
the idea of offsets (pp.  265-266). Germany was “unusually successful”  with its objective of 
integrating offsets resulting from post-WW II rearmament but almost certainly not only because 
of its own careful planning but because of NATO’s interest in successfully binding Germany into 
the  alliance  (Mawdsley  and  Brzoska,  pp.  108-110).  Even so,  reflecting  its  civilian-industrial 
strengths  Germany’s  defense  work  today  is  niche  production  in  the  automotive  and  marine 
industries (tanks, ships) rather than in aircraft and electronics. 
  Finally, with regard to South Africa, it must be acknowledged that the country has some 
indigenous  industrial  capacity  that  could  be  exploited  if  South  African  firms  were  to  be 
integrated into an emerging European or global arms production supply chain (Dunne and Lamb, 
p. 288). But potential need not and may not translate into actual experience. As regards the non-
defense industry, the authors question the offset deal. For instance, they write that “it is not clear 
whether South Africa is getting state-of-the-art technology in areas of growth, or old technology 
in areas of overcapacity (e.g., stainless steel)” (Dunne and Lamb, p. 290). In fact, the BIS reports 
that  “anecdotal  information  obtained  from  industry  suggests  that  ‘cutting  edge’  or  nascent 
technologies under development in the United States are less likely to be transferred to foreign 
companies in fulfillment of offset obligations than ‘older’ technologies” (BIS, 2008, p. 19). 
 
Lessons and issues 
 
Although for many countries this may reasonably be disputed (Dumas, ch. 1), assume that arms 
imports are in fact needed for legitimate defense purposes. There is nonetheless a crying need for 
countries to obtain a much better idea of what works under what circumstances, and what does 
not work (Taylor, ch. 2, and Markowski and Hall, ch. 3, offer some guidelines). To date, the 
evidence does not suggest that offsets advance countries’ long-term goals. To summarize this 
evidence, it is now quite clear that offsets do not result in arms acquisition cost reductions, that 
offsets do not stimulate broad-based civilian economic development, that neither substantial nor 
sustained  job  creation  occurs,  not  even  within  the  military  sector, that  almost  no  successful 
technology transfer into the civilian sector is observed, and that only limited technology transfer 
into  the  military  sector  occurs,  often  over  decades  and  at  high  cost.  Moreover,  whatever 
technology is transferred is quickly outpaced by continuous technology advances in the main 
developed countries, especially the United States. 
  These lessons can be drawn in spite of severe data problems (e.g., Baskaran, p. 217, on India; 
Dunne and Lamb, p. 289, on South Africa; Hagelin, p. 143, on Norway; and Hartley, p. 118, generally). But from what data points are available, the general picture can be pieced together. 
The  onus  to  prove  otherwise  lies  with  those  who  would  champion  the  case  of  offsets. 
Regrettably, their case relies on pre-offset assertions, rather than post-offset evidence. As Hartley 
points out, the incentive is to exaggerate benefits and understate or ignore the costs (p. 121). 
  The case studies raise several additional issues: 
1.  Data,  access,  and  audits:  As  mentioned,  the  data  situation  is  poor.  So  is  countries’ 
willingness to allow researchers access to offset-related data, even in democracies. This is 
difficult to justify. Any country ought to be interested whether or not policies work and what 
their costs are. Where public funds are expended, public accounting is needed. There is no 
reason to treat the military any different. The press widely reports on offset deals so that 
there can be no fear about military secrets being revealed. Even for their own internal use, 
governments ought to want to know what offsets cost their countries. This would improve 
decision making. From the country case studies it appears that only Australia, Finland, and 
Sweden  have  ever  carried  out  official  audits  of  specific  arms  trade  offset  contracts  (in 
Finland 1 out of 20 offset deals since 1977; in and Sweden 3 out of 15 since 1983). 
  Audits need to be done on economic principles, counting all economic costs (Brauer, ch. 
4). This would include for instance environmental costs associated with weapon production, 
the cost of manpower training, special infrastructure construction, and other resource uses to 
support offset work, as well as the opportunity cost of directing resources to offset rather than 
other work.  All this  requires  a  sophisticated  set  of  monitoring tools  and  abilities  by the 
relevant state agencies which especially in developing countries may not be readily available. 
Still, expert consultants could be hired to take at least a partial look at things. Offsets should 
not be excluded from the planning, execution, and feedback loop. 
2.  Vulnerabilities:  Data  apart,  the case  studies  lead  to  a  striking  observation:  Brazil’s  arms 
industry  collapsed  post-1988  with  the  end  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war;  Argentina’s  vanished, 
Poland’s folded, western Europe’s bent, post-1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc;  and  South  Africa’s  industry  faltered  post-1994  with  the  end  of  apartheid. 
Unsurprisingly for an industry that thrives on latent and actual conflict, less or less intense 
conflict lowers demand for its products. It seems absurd then that some countries still intend 
to build the industry and that offsets are thought (and sought) to promote this. In a declining 
market,  exit  not  entry  has  to  occur.  Thus  it  is  virtually  certain  that  even  as  developing 
countries are trying to build arms industries, the industry will decline and some producers be 
withdrawn from the market, as Argentina and Belgium already all but completely have (for 
evidence  of  exit,  see  Brauer,  2007).  Tellingly,  where  tensions  remain  –  the  Indian 
subcontinent, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan – costly arms industry efforts continue. 
  Vulnerability stems not only from lack of demand but also from other market forces such 
as the collapse of Indonesia’s arms industry post-1997 in the wake of the East Asian financial 
crisis  illustrates.  A  third  vulnerability  comes  from  the  growing  technology  gap  between 
developed  and  developing  countries.  Even  if  some  militarily-relevant  technology  is 
transferred, it is illogical to believe that leading countries will voluntarily surrender their 
technology lead. (Indeed, any truly remarkable advances appear to have come from illegally 
transferred  technologies  or  from  exceedingly  costly  ones  unrelated  to  any  officially 
sanctioned offsets, e.g., rockets, missiles, nuclear technology.) 
3.  Military Malthusianism: A fourth vulnerability is compellingly illustrated by Scheetz’s case 
study of Argentina (ch. 14). “Military Malthusianism” arises from a single inescapable fact, 
namely  that  the  unit-cost  of  major  weapon  systems  rise  faster  than  government  budget revenues  (geometric  against  arithmetic  series).  When  even  well-developed,  industrialized 
countries such as those of western Europe cannot cope anymore with spiraling unit-costs, it is 
fantastic to believe that developing states will be able to do so. Even the United States cannot 
entirely cope with the extraordinary cost in all weapons classes, hence its invitation to select 
countries  from  across  the  globe  to  join  it  in  the  development  of  its  Joint  Strike  Fighter 
program. 
  As  a  consequence  of  this  military  Malthusianism,  states  are  left  with  four  options 
(Hartley, p. 118): (1) the “equal misery” option in which a state’s defense programs are cut 
across  the  board;  (2)  the  “defense  review”  option  that  would  reduce  states’  defense 
commitments; (3) the “increased defense budget” option which would come at the expense of 
non-defense  programs  or  a  higher  tax-take;  and  (4)  the  “increased  efficiency”  option  to 
obtain economies by globalizing arms production and arms acquisition. Options 1 to 3 have 
variously been tried or are not feasible. Option 4 would make countries’ arms industries 
mutually dependent, and although that is the current trend, the long-run consequence would 
be that countries cannot fight when important arms component production sites are located in 
each others’ territories. Military Malthusianism thus raises the tantalizing hope that as unit-
costs of weapon systems become unaffordable we might be spending ourselves to peace. 
  But this will not happen for there is a fifth option, not noted by Hartley. That is that states 
or  other  actors  will  offend,  deter,  and  defend  differently.  They  will,  in  a  word,  find 
substitutes. In fact, this has been going on for some time as the examples of state-sponsored 
or  state-supported  terrorism,  guerrilla  warfare,  low-intensity  warfare,  low-tech  warfare, 
proxy  wars,  and  the  use  of  private  military  companies  illustrate.  Military  Malthusianism 
implies that we will see more non-conventional conflict. 
4.  The strong and the weak: To be sure, there is concern that offsets help create international 
competitors in the short term. But offsets combined with the vulnerabilities listed in points 2 
and 3 create not merely an increasing number of arms producers but an enfeebled number of 
state-based arms industries, kept alive by an infusion of costly state aid as in Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and other countries. It is not surprising then that a 
number of arms producing countries turn out to be too weak to survive in the arms market 
(Brauer, 2007). They become infant industries that never grow up and drain the economies of 
the  mother  state.  Some  of  these  infants  have  died  (e.g.,  Argentina);  others  survive  by 
becoming “orphans,” adopted by strong industrial powerhouses that integrate the weak into a 
global supply-chain (e.g., Singapore, an increasing number of western European countries, 
and to a lesser extent Taiwan and South Korea).
15 
5.  Arms globalization: The most likely of Hartley’s four options to be adopted in the short-run – 
at  least  in  the  European  context  –  is  increased  arms  internationalization.  Gradually,  EU 
members will drift toward a European Arms Procurement Agency with competitively let 
contracts.
16 Certain developing countries or countries in the Far East will seek to become part 
of the supply-chain either with U.S. or EU firms, or both, much as is the case now with the 
commercial aircraft of Boeing and Airbus. In this case, offsets for major weapon systems 
would largely disappear, and the defense industry would become just another industry, much 
like globalized automobile or consumer electronics design, manufacturing, and distribution. 
  This  is  not to  say that  we  will  see  a  two-bloc  system,  the  United  States  against the 
European Union. The Joint Strike Fighter model, although led by the U.S. already involves 
several European and non-European partners, and it is not inconceivable that in future the EU 
will take the lead in other projects, such as armored vehicles. Joining an arms supply chain may,  at  any  rate,  be  the  only  remaining  realistic  option  for  several  small,  industrialized 
European  and  non-European  countries  (e.g.,  Australia,  Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  New 
Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan). As Chinworth writes (p. 247), “typically, offsets have been 
post-production  agreements  but  increased  globalization  results  in  more  pre-production 
agreements  that  determine  work  share  and  technology  transfers,”  most  likely  based  on 
market competition. 
6.  Offsets will not disappear but may be in retreat: The United States’ government officially 
regards offsets to be “economically inefficient and trade distorting” (BIS, 2008, p. i). More 
pointedly, it is concerned about the viability of its defense industrial base when bits of the 
defense  supply  chain  may  be  undermined  by  shipping  defense-export  work  abroad.  For 
example, for 2004-2007, the estimated dollar value of domestic work accruing to defense-
export  sales  in  the  U.S.  aerospace  sector  was  $18.4  billion,  half  of  which  was  lost 
(transferred abroad) due to offset contracts (BIS, 2008, p. 17, Table 5-4). Put differently, 
defense exports do result in a net economic gain to the economy of the United States but only 
by half as much as would have been the case in the absence of offset agreements. A U.S. 
government “interagency team was able to conclude that the United States is not alone in its 
concerns about the use of offsets in defense procurement. Other industrialized nations, which 
also are major providers of offsets, expressed concerns about the adverse effects of offsets on 
their  sales  of  defense  weapons  systems.  These  provider  nations  expressed  interest  in  a 
multinational  dialogue  to  address  their  concerns.  From both providers  and  demanders  of 
offsets, most nations agree with the United States’ view that there is a real cost associated 
with offsets.”
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  Correspondingly, 26 states have subscribed to the European Defense Agency’s “Code of 
Conduct on Offsets,” which took effect on 1 July 2009. The Code (1) provides for a bit of 
transparency (collecting states’ basic offset information on a common web site), (2) strives to 
avoid  undue  competition  by  collecting  defense  work  across  the  member  states  without 
distorting offsets, that is, to promote the development of a European Defense Technological 
and Industrial Base (EDTIB), (3) limits offsets to a cap of 100 percent of contract value, and 
(4) puts a reporting and monitoring system in place. In an interview the director of EDA’s 
Defence Industry and Market Directorate, Arturo Alfonso-Meirino, acknowledged however, 
that the Code applies only to its subscribing states and the non-members, i.e., major arms 
buyers such as India, China, and Middle Eastern states still will demand offsets.
18 Arms trade 
offsets thus will not just disappear. Nonetheless, that both the United States and the European 
Union (through EDA) at the highest government levels steer against the use of arms trade 
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1. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar-values in this chapter refer to U.S. dollars. 
2. Section 309 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. 
3.    See  http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/offsets/default.htm 
[accessed 13 July 2009]. 
4. When the nominal dollar figures are deflated using 2000 as the base-year, the totals are nearly 
identical  to  those  reported  in  the  text,  probably  because  the  year  2000  lies  about  half-way 
between 1993 and 2007. 
5. On the arms exporting side of the ledger, arms exporters (e.g, in the U.S., U.K, Sweden, and 
others)  almost  always  see  offset  requirements  as  a  costly  distraction  and  nuisance  (e.g., 
Mawdsley and Brzoska, p. 106), something that has to be done to win contracts but that they 
would prefer to be able to avoid. 
6.  For  certain  EU  states,  updated  information  may  be  obtained  from 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/,  the  European  Defense  Agency’s  web  page  on  offsets 
[accessed 16 July 2009]. The EDA was established on 12 July 2004. 
7. Information extracted from BIS (2008). 
8. See EDA (2009), then click on “Norway.” 
9.  In  practice  net  external,  i.e.,  foreign-exchange,  costs  are  never  zero  since  domestic  co-
production invariably requires at least some imports of weapon system components. 
10. In 1996-97 in Australia for example, as a consequence of offset regulations, “87 percent of 
expenditure  on  defense  logistics  was  spent  in-country,  55  percent  of  capital  equipment  was                                                                                                                                                              
sourced  locally,  and  99  percent  of  expenditure  on  capital  facilities  was  spent  in-country” 
(Markowski and Hall, p. 273). 
11. Germany does not have pure defense firms; instead defense work is carried out in firms that 
are primarily civilian (Mawdsley and Brzoska, pp. 108-109). 
12. An earlier case study on defense offsets in Saudi Arabia “reveals that instead of a projected 
75,000  local  jobs,  the  various  programs  generated  employment  in  the  region  of  2,000” 
(Matthews, 2002). 
13. Available via www.offset.ae [accessed 16 July 2009]. 
14. The Indigenous Fighter Aircraft, for example, ran into cost and quality control problems 
limiting its production run. 
 
15. “The number of competitors in the world arms market has imploded even though each has 
somewhat  greater  access  to  each  others’  domestic  markets.  The  competition  remains 
oligopolistic but is more international in scope” (Markusen, p. 81). 
16. Whether beyond that there will perhaps lie a genuine EU-wide defense and foreign policy 
with defense functions turned over to the EU as well is beyond this chapter to discuss. 
17. BIS (2008, Appendix F, p. 3). 
18. EPICOS newsletter, 4 March 2009, p. 4; available on www.epicos.com [accessed 16 July 
2009]. 